Tuesday, April 18, 2006
introduction and conclusion
1. Introduction
There are certain periods in the life of an organization where crucial decisions for its
survival have to be made under circumstances of extreme pressure due to certain
incidents or events. These periods, which usually lead at a “turning point” in the
organizations lifecycle, are known as periods of crisis. In today’s dynamic, highvelocity
social and business environment, which is characterized by discontinuity and
disruptive change, crises are understood as more the norm rather than exception in
organizations. Managers increasingly realise “…that anytime you are not in a crisis,
you are instead in a pre-crisis, or a prodromal mode” (Fink, 1986:5). It is no longer a
question of “if” an organization will face a crisis; it is, rather, a question of “when,”
“what type” and “how prepared” the company is to deal with it (Mitroff et al., 1996).
No one person or organization, no country, nor a system is immune from crisis
(Coombs, 1999). Organizations that actually have a planned approach to deal with
crises hold that crises can be managed through a functional adaptation of the
organization, its management and their decision making processes to the extreme
conditions of the crisis. They focus on prevention and preparedness, invest substantial
resources in planning an effective crisis response and the continuity of their missioncritical
functions through the crisis and anticipate a reasonable recovery and return to
“business-as-usual” mode in the aftermath of the crisis. However, although this is the
dominant “crisis management” paradigm, it simply views a crisis as an isolated event
with a clearly identifiable trajectory that is bounded by a beginning and an end and
causing death, mayhem and other damage (Rosenthal, 1998). This view has been
called into question by several scholars who argue that today crises are not boxed in
by set dates that mark a clear beginning and ending and are embedded vulnerabilities
that smolder, emerge, wind down, mutate, and flare up again (‘t Hart & Boin, 2001).
Crises are becoming increasingly complex in both quantitative and qualitative terms
(Robert & Lajtha, 2002) and the traditional approach in dealing with them is often
proven inadequate and ineffective. This paper builds on work exploring the usefulness
of chaos and complexity science principles and concepts in dealing with crises
(Murphy, 1996; Comfort, 1996; Seeger, 2002) and develops it further by offering a
complexity perspective for the design of a crisis response system.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to give a new context to crisis response. The basic
concepts of crisis planning, signal detection, prevention/mitigation, damage
limitation, recovery, etc. are still present throughout the paper. Complexity science
does not make the current terminology redundant but gives a new context to crisis
response. As illustrated by an excellent metaphor by Goss, Pascale and Athos
(1993:100) “context is like the colour of the light, not the objects in the room”. The
concepts of complexity science give us another view of the interactions between crisis
response and the evolution of the organization, far from equilibrium dynamics,
positive and negative feedback loops that can sustain or offset the crisis response, as
well as the important fact that crises are themselves complex systems and therefore
often not directly controllable by the organization.
In this turbulent environment crisis planning has a diminishing capacity to achieve
specific outcomes, especially at more aggregate levels. Nevertheless, the crisis
response system has the ability to shape the overall trajectory of the organization’s
evolution. The complexity science perspective also shifts the focus of crisis response
from specific crisis-related outcomes towards crisis response processes and relations
between the crisis stakeholders. The paper has also offered a framework for the
design of a crisis response system identifying the specific attributes is should possess
in addition to those of a CCES. However, much more research is necessary before the
full implications of complexity theory for organizational crisis response are fully
understood
There are certain periods in the life of an organization where crucial decisions for its
survival have to be made under circumstances of extreme pressure due to certain
incidents or events. These periods, which usually lead at a “turning point” in the
organizations lifecycle, are known as periods of crisis. In today’s dynamic, highvelocity
social and business environment, which is characterized by discontinuity and
disruptive change, crises are understood as more the norm rather than exception in
organizations. Managers increasingly realise “…that anytime you are not in a crisis,
you are instead in a pre-crisis, or a prodromal mode” (Fink, 1986:5). It is no longer a
question of “if” an organization will face a crisis; it is, rather, a question of “when,”
“what type” and “how prepared” the company is to deal with it (Mitroff et al., 1996).
No one person or organization, no country, nor a system is immune from crisis
(Coombs, 1999). Organizations that actually have a planned approach to deal with
crises hold that crises can be managed through a functional adaptation of the
organization, its management and their decision making processes to the extreme
conditions of the crisis. They focus on prevention and preparedness, invest substantial
resources in planning an effective crisis response and the continuity of their missioncritical
functions through the crisis and anticipate a reasonable recovery and return to
“business-as-usual” mode in the aftermath of the crisis. However, although this is the
dominant “crisis management” paradigm, it simply views a crisis as an isolated event
with a clearly identifiable trajectory that is bounded by a beginning and an end and
causing death, mayhem and other damage (Rosenthal, 1998). This view has been
called into question by several scholars who argue that today crises are not boxed in
by set dates that mark a clear beginning and ending and are embedded vulnerabilities
that smolder, emerge, wind down, mutate, and flare up again (‘t Hart & Boin, 2001).
Crises are becoming increasingly complex in both quantitative and qualitative terms
(Robert & Lajtha, 2002) and the traditional approach in dealing with them is often
proven inadequate and ineffective. This paper builds on work exploring the usefulness
of chaos and complexity science principles and concepts in dealing with crises
(Murphy, 1996; Comfort, 1996; Seeger, 2002) and develops it further by offering a
complexity perspective for the design of a crisis response system.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to give a new context to crisis response. The basic
concepts of crisis planning, signal detection, prevention/mitigation, damage
limitation, recovery, etc. are still present throughout the paper. Complexity science
does not make the current terminology redundant but gives a new context to crisis
response. As illustrated by an excellent metaphor by Goss, Pascale and Athos
(1993:100) “context is like the colour of the light, not the objects in the room”. The
concepts of complexity science give us another view of the interactions between crisis
response and the evolution of the organization, far from equilibrium dynamics,
positive and negative feedback loops that can sustain or offset the crisis response, as
well as the important fact that crises are themselves complex systems and therefore
often not directly controllable by the organization.
In this turbulent environment crisis planning has a diminishing capacity to achieve
specific outcomes, especially at more aggregate levels. Nevertheless, the crisis
response system has the ability to shape the overall trajectory of the organization’s
evolution. The complexity science perspective also shifts the focus of crisis response
from specific crisis-related outcomes towards crisis response processes and relations
between the crisis stakeholders. The paper has also offered a framework for the
design of a crisis response system identifying the specific attributes is should possess
in addition to those of a CCES. However, much more research is necessary before the
full implications of complexity theory for organizational crisis response are fully
understood
